Responsible Statecraft has reported:

A recently announced agreement to lift U.S. sanctions on Russian diesel is unlikely to change American fuel consumption or global prices significantly, and its impact on negotiations to end the war in Ukraine remains uncertain. The deal, presented as a way to ease fuel-market pressure ahead of the U.S. midterm elections, has revived debate about whether easing sanctions could help diplomacy or weaken pressure on Moscow.

The broader question, as the midterms approach and headlines about the war emerge rapidly, is how the United States can help establish a self-sustaining European equilibrium while preserving Washington’s freedom to act in a world with several centres of power. A comprehensive settlement to the war is necessary to that effort, though it would not be enough by itself.

European leaders see Russia’s war of aggression as both a security threat and a fundamental violation of the post-Cold War compact on the continent. That breach will not soon be forgotten. While the fighting continues, Europe and Russia are unlikely to establish a stable balance of power on their own. A ceasefire that leaves the deeper political divisions untouched would not resolve that problem either.

Time to settle the war on terms broadly acceptable to current European opinion is running out, the argument says. The urgency of that larger task should remain in view amid a succession of announcements and speculation.

Critics of the diesel agreement say it lifts pressure on Russia at an unacceptable moment. But the case that more sanctions would force Moscow to change course is weak, according to the argument. Nearly five years into a devastating war of attrition that has killed hundreds of thousands of people, Russia does not appear close to a full economic collapse. Those who expected sanctions eventually to compel a change in policy must recognize that hope is not a strategy. More pressure, on its own, is no cure for the war.

That does not mean the diesel deal will restart diplomacy by itself. The Trump administration often presents economic agreements as a way forward, but commercial arrangements cannot replace negotiations over the political and security disputes that preceded the invasion and conflict.

The administration may have expected the diesel agreement to generate enough goodwill to support an energy ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. That expectation appears to have been misplaced. Moscow has read Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s stated openness to such a ceasefire as a sign of weakness, according to the analysis. Russian leaders may believe their strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure are inflicting greater damage than Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries.

Russia could potentially accept an energy ceasefire in exchange for substantially greater sanctions relief. Kyiv would regard that kind of concession as misguided, however, because it would add to Russia’s resources for continuing the war. The proposal therefore illustrates the limits of seeking de-escalation through a narrow exchange while Moscow believes it holds the stronger hand.

Recent reporting suggests the administration recognizes the need to broaden negotiations to include wider security questions, rather than focusing only on reducing the immediate conflict. The analysis describes that as a sound approach. The war is rooted in decades of disagreement over who should make the rules governing European security and how those rules should be set. A broader negotiation could give all sides more to gain from an agreement.

The proposals reportedly under discussion among American, European and Ukrainian interlocutors remain unclear, and judgment on them should be suspended for now. Some reported ideas would be difficult for Europeans to accept, including releasing some of Russia’s frozen assets and building new pipeline infrastructure from Russia to Europe. Other possibilities, such as freezing the conflict along its current front line, conflict with Russia’s declared position. Reacting to each report in isolation risks obscuring the need for a settlement.

Political developments in France could also affect Ukraine’s prospects. Several months remain before the French presidential elections, but recent polls show hard-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon moving into second place. If that outcome held, it would virtually guarantee Marine Le Pen’s victory in the second round, the analysis says. That could disrupt Kyiv’s bid to join the European Union and raise questions about the future of European assistance to Ukraine, with potentially devastating consequences for its war effort.

The argument recalls a warning from Mark Milley, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who said in late 2022 that Ukraine should negotiate peace while it remained in a position of strength. Kyiv did not heed his words, and its leverage has gradually diminished. Recent months have not brought a turn in the war in Ukraine’s favour, the analysis says; claims that they had were a narrative that again delayed difficult decisions.

There are also doubts about whether U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner can manage the complicated negotiations required to build a new European security order. Separately, the analysis says Zelensky may have a personal interest in the war continuing because he fears what could happen to him after leaving office. It presents that as a reason for concern, apart from Ukraine’s legitimate right to defend itself against aggression.

European leaders, the argument concludes, should not let the prospect of an imperfect agreement prevent them from pursuing what may be Ukraine’s last chance for a decent outcome. Acting as a geopolitical force means using both incentives and pressure to shape the security environment. Any settlement will require compromises from both belligerents, regardless of which side is morally right. The time has passed for allowing a perfect outcome to block a good one, and without determined action even a good result could soon be out of reach.