Responsible Statecraft has reported:

President Donald Trump appears to believe that continued pressure on Iran can produce a decisive U.S. victory, even as the conflict shows no clear resolution. U.S. Navy operations in the Strait of Hormuz have blocked most Iranian imports and oil exports while restoring some oil trade through the strait by countries other than Iran. The distribution of economic costs and the movement of oil are more complicated than a simple U.S. advantage, however, and a naval blockade is an act of war.

Trump has treated the conflict as a contest in which one side wins and the other loses, consistent with his approach to military action, trade agreements and real estate deals. He does not admit mistakes, particularly in public, and has not clearly defined what would count as success in the war. The pursuit of a claimable “win” is therefore shaping the conflict even though the issues at stake and the terms for a stable peace are more complex.

The author argues that wars are best understood as ending through negotiated bargains. A book the author wrote more than four decades ago examined that idea, including the fact that even supposedly unconditional surrenders involve an exchange: one side agrees not to continue resisting, while the other ends its assault. Other scholars have applied the same concept to modern conflicts. Framing U.S. strategy mainly in terms of victory and defeat can obscure the issues, their bearing on U.S. interests and the arrangements needed to stop fighting and sustain peace.

The article identifies two outcomes Trump might present as a victory: Iran’s regime making concessions that clearly and significantly exceed earlier offers, or the regime collapsing. Those possibilities conflict with each other. If Iranian leaders believe the United States is intent on destroying their government, they have little reason to make concessions and may see continued fighting as their only option. Each outcome also raises practical questions on its own.

For Iranian concessions to serve U.S. interests, they would need to be significant and realistically obtainable even from a government under severe pressure. Assessing what would qualify is difficult because Trump and his administration have not set out consistent war aims. Their statements have varied, at times including a demand for “unconditional surrender,” which the author says is unrealistic to expect from any Iranian government.

Iran’s nuclear programme is the issue mentioned most often. Vice-President JD Vance came closest to specifying a condition for peace when he said just last week that “meaningful” reductions in Iran’s uranium enrichment would be necessary. The programme concerns U.S. interests because of the possibility that Iran could develop a nuclear weapon. The author argues that continuing the war does not help address that risk: earlier attacks had already largely disabled the programme, while the intentions of Iran’s leaders now matter at least as much as their technical capabilities.

Continued attacks could strengthen Iranian voices calling for a nuclear deterrent. There is already discussion in Tehran about withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A country under ongoing foreign attack may become more inclined to seek a deterrent, the article says, which could work against efforts to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly called the Iran deal, offers an example of the detail required for a meaningful nuclear agreement. It entered into force in 2015 and effectively closed all possible routes to an Iranian nuclear weapon. Trump abandoned it in 2018, determined to dismantle what was widely viewed as the most significant foreign-policy achievement of President Barack Obama.

The agreement ran 159 pages and emerged from difficult, detailed negotiations lasting several years, with numerous nuclear experts and other specialists involved. The author argues that it is not the kind of accord Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner could produce in a couple of negotiating sessions. A new U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement would require comparable detail to ensure restrictions were meaningful, enforceable and verifiable through international inspections.

Making a completed, comprehensive nuclear deal a precondition for ending the war, instead of pairing a ceasefire with a commitment to serious future talks, could mean fighting for months or possibly years. The administration has also complicated the prospect of negotiations through its recent nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia. That agreement has raised concerns among non-proliferation experts because it does not require the strictest form of international inspections and opens the door to Saudi uranium enrichment, including to the 20 per cent level.

An Iranian government would be unlikely to accept restrictions on its own nuclear programme that are more limiting than those applied to Saudi Arabia, Iran’s rival across the Persian Gulf, particularly when Saudi Arabia has U.S. approval and assistance. The author presents that difference as an obstacle any U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiation would have to address.

Regime change is the other possible route to a victory, but Trump has already claimed such a change occurred after senior Iranian leaders were killed in the war’s opening days. The result, according to the article, was that Iranian hardliners became more powerful than they had been while Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was alive. A further wartime leadership change could shift Iran further toward hardline rule, potentially producing a military dictatorship that suppresses the regime’s remaining moderate voices.

Even a leadership change that appeared more favourable to Washington would not ensure that agreements could be made or honoured. Any future government would have to manage Iranian factions with competing views, which would remain in place after a change at the top. The people who might seem most sympathetic to the United States would not necessarily be the ones able to influence those groups or make commitments that the whole power structure would accept.

The killing of Ali Larijani illustrates the loss of a figure who could potentially have played that role. An Israeli airstrike killed Larijani two weeks into the war. He was secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and a product of the Khamenei regime, but the author describes him as a pragmatist with the political skill and connections to make credible commitments on behalf of Tehran’s entire power structure.

The hardship faced by Iran’s population could contribute to a popular uprising and wider political upheaval, but the article sets out several reasons not to treat that outcome as assured. Popular uprisings have occurred more than once during the Islamic Republic’s history without bringing down the regime. At present, Iran has no cohesive opposition movement comparable to the one led by Ruhollah Khomeini during the 1979 revolution that overthrew the shah.

A continuing war also makes an uprising less likely, the author argues, because it has produced a rally-around-the-flag effect. Iranians can see U.S. military and economic attacks as directed at the country as a whole, not only at its rulers. The conflict is likely to leave widespread resentment toward the United States for the suffering imposed on the population, and that anger would grow the longer the war continued. Any new Iranian government would have to take that sentiment into account.

The article also cautions against assuming that a change of rulers would fundamentally alter Iranian policy. Past decisions have reflected security concerns and nationalism as well as the ideology of the government in power. Those forces would continue to shape policy under new leadership.

The author concludes that the United States should not count on major concessions at the outset or on regime change as the basis for ending the war. The most feasible path is a basic ceasefire that postpones most substantive negotiations. The proposed model is the Memorandum of Understanding the parties agreed to in June, revised to remove the ambiguous language about the Strait of Hormuz that led to its breakdown.

A president seeking a public victory would then have to describe the ceasefire and the damage already inflicted on Iranian forces as a success. The author’s assessment is that such a rhetorical claim may be more attainable than a settlement based on sweeping concessions or the collapse of Iran’s government.