Milorad Dodik’s Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) won decisively in Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s October 4 election, despite a ban preventing Dodik from running. Nationalist Bosniak and Croat parties also dominated in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country’s other political entity, leaving the vote with little indication of a shift away from the established political order.

The result underscored the influence of Dodik, the de facto leader of the Bosnian Serb entity, even as he remains barred from office. It also highlighted how political authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be exercised through relationships and influence outside formal institutions. The country’s weak institutions, corruption and ethnic divisions continue to constrain its politics.

The election took place amid a changing international landscape. The Trump administration has lifted sanctions imposed on Dodik by the Biden and Obama administrations, while Russia continues to cultivate close ties with Republika Srpska. The European Union, meanwhile, has struggled to use the prospect of membership to advance reforms.

Leila Bičakčić, chief executive officer of the Center for Investigative Reporting, said Dodik emerged from the period of U.S. sanctions politically stronger than before. His ability to sustain relationships with the United States, Russia, Israel and nationalist movements elsewhere in Europe illustrates how much political authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina can sit beyond the institutions meant to exercise it, she said.

The shift in U.S. policy includes President Donald Trump’s decision to remove sanctions on Dodik and his allies. The United States had imposed the sanctions in response to Dodik’s separatist ambitions and alleged corruption. Dejan Sajinovic, a Bosnian journalist from Republika Srpska, views the new relationship as an example of a more transactional American foreign policy.

Republika Srpska has spent more than $4 million since the beginning of 2025 on lobbyists and surrogates linked to Trump. The spending appears to have played an important role in Dodik’s effort to gain support from the White House. “It is a quid pro quo,” Sajinovic told Responsible Statecraft, saying Washington appears willing to support Dodik politically if he can help advance U.S. strategic and commercial interests in the Western Balkans.

The precise terms of any understanding between the Trump administration and Dodik remain unclear, but a disputed energy project is central to the relationship. The proposed Southern Interconnection pipeline would connect Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia’s gas network and the Krk liquefied natural gas terminal, allowing the country to reduce its dependence on Russian gas.

Bosnian legislation has named AAFS Infrastructure and Energy, a recently formed Wyoming-based company, as the project’s lead investor and operator without a competitive tender. The company is fronted by Trump allies Jesse Binnall and Joe Flynn. Critics have questioned the process’s transparency and AAFS’s lack of a relevant track record.

Two Trump political advisers, James Blair and Chris LaCivita, travelled to Republika Srpska shortly before the October vote to advise the entity’s government. Both received hundreds of thousands of dollars through a Washington, D.C., law firm retained by the Republika Srpska government to promote Dodik and the SNSD.

Their work in the Balkans drew controversy after news of the trip emerged. Trump then vowed to terminate Blair and LaCivita as his consultants if their political work in the region conflicted with the White House’s interests.

The election also exposed the limits of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political framework, established by the 1995 Dayton Accords. The agreement ended the war by creating an elaborate power-sharing system among Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. Thirty-one years later, the system has contributed to political paralysis, though it has prevented the country from returning to war.

Tanja Topic, a political analyst based in Banja Luka, Republika Srpska’s administrative centre, said the Dayton framework has become “too narrow for the normal functioning of BiH.” She pointed to years of blockades at the state level and constitutional provisions that discriminate against citizens who do not identify with one of the country’s three constituent peoples.

Sajinovic cautioned against treating Dayton as the only source of the problem. Bosnia’s multiple identities make some form of decentralized power-sharing unavoidable, he argued. The deeper issue is that political elites have learned to use the system’s complexity and veto points to protect their influence, and the election offered little evidence that those incentives are changing.

For the European Union, the outcome raises questions about whether enlargement can still encourage political reform. Bosnia and Herzegovina received candidate status in 2022 and approval to open accession negotiations in 2024, but talks have stalled over reforms that have not been completed, including judicial oversight and measures to curb corruption.

The EU agenda has receded from political debate as fears of renewed conflict have grown. Bičakčić said political elites lack interest in the rule-of-law reforms, stronger institutions and rights required for EU integration. If membership no longer offers a credible incentive for change, the bloc risks retaining influence only on paper.

Russia has long maintained close ties with Republika Srpska, and Russian President Vladimir Putin is a close ally of Dodik. Dodik has rejected Western sanctions on Russia and described Putin as “one of the most peace-loving leaders of our time.” Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Dodik has met with Putin 11 times. His most recent trip to Moscow came only days before the October 4 vote.

Vuk Vuksanović, a lecturer at King’s College London, said Russia benefits from Western failures. “Russia profits without investing any effort” by watching a state created through U.S. policy struggle to function while the EU fails to manage its own neighbourhood, he said.

Igor Novaković, a senior associate at the International and Security Affairs Centre, or ISAC Fund, said Russia’s role should not be overstated. In his view, Moscow is too occupied with Ukraine to achieve much in Bosnia and Herzegovina and lacks a real strategy for the Western Balkans.

“My impression is that [the Russians] are focusing on maintaining the current position, supporting, mostly verbally, some of the leaders in the Balkans,” Novaković said. “But in essence they will not go as far as to directly intervene or to do more than, let’s say, disinformation to an extent - maybe using the Western Balkans for some hybrid operations against Western Europe - but not more than that.”

The election also points to a weakening of the international consensus that has supported Bosnia’s post-1995 order. Sajinovic said the country has functioned best when major outside powers agreed on its direction, and struggled when that consensus broke down. Divisions within Europe and between Washington and Brussels have created more room for Bosnia’s political actors to pursue their own agendas.

The result does not mean Bosnia and Herzegovina is inevitably heading back to war, but it has prompted concern about the country’s trajectory. Turnout fell eight percentage points from 2022, while economic problems, emigration and political stagnation remain urgent issues. Many voters appear increasingly frustrated by a system that encourages ethnic competition instead of effective government and economic opportunity.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is left with familiar political forces in a more unsettled international environment, marked by Dodik’s continuing influence, weaker Western leverage and the potential for Russia to exploit divisions. The country’s path out of the cycle will depend on whether its political leaders can reach a new domestic compromise and whether the United States and Europe can agree on what that compromise should accomplish.

Based on reporting by Responsible Statecraft.